Andrew Roberts Discusses the Role of Evolving Political Institutions in Modern Europe

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Since the end of World War II, Western European government institutions have gradually transformed from imperial and fascist to liberal and democratic, favoring free market economies, encouraging global trade through organizations such as the European Union, and maintaining primarily democratic norms. Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Eastern European government institutions, which had previously been under the direct influence of the Soviet Union and thus constituted regulatory communist economic and governmental systems, have largely followed suit.

However, in recent years, the trend towards liberalization has begun to stagnate, as both Western and Eastern European countries have embraced more populist, nationalist, and authoritarian ideals. While there are many arguments as to why this has been occurring, political consensus points towards rising dissatisfaction with globalized economies, fears over increased immigration, and increasing public mistrust of democratic institutions.

Yet alongside domestic political shifts, a Cold War-era dynamic of the continent’s geopolitics remains: skepticism between Eastern and Western European states. This mistrust, despite cultural and political convergence, is leading to the breakdown of the alliances and partnerships that have bound them together. These divisions, which have coincided with the rise of increasingly extremist governments in Europe, could permanently alter the institutional makeup, or political and financial structure, of European states for decades to come, with the core philosophies of either the East or West likely winning out continent-wide at the end of this critical period.

To explore these developments and their implications, I interviewed Northwestern political science professor Andrew Roberts, a comparative politics expert concentrating on the political effects of parties, public opinion, and political communication. He specializes in post-Cold War European Politics and has researched the state of democracy, the impacts of government institutions, and issues of representation and accountability in European states.

In Professor Roberts’s 2010 book The Quality of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Public Preferences and Policy Reforms, published by Cambridge University Press, he discusses the legacy of communism in newly formed democracies in Eastern Europe and analyzes the extent to which governments in the region adhere to democratic norms. Roberts also discusses the issues that have affected European governmental institutions in recent decades and presents his perspective on how European states should structure their institutions for the future.

Does Europe still currently have an institutional East-West divide?

I’d definitely say so. Western European states have prioritized free market, capitalist democracies since the mid-20th century, whereas Eastern Europe was more about collective development. After the Cold War, Eastern European states, at least the ones now part of the European Union, which had a very different set of institutions under communism, have attempted to adopt some version of Western European institutions, meaning liberal democratic and free market economic principles, to varying degrees of success.

Within the East, though, there’s been plenty of tension that has built over these changes, which has even begun to spread to the West in some capacity. The political divide that separated the halves of Europe during the Cold War seems to have now turned into more of a cultural divide, where, due to dissatisfaction with Western “political correctness” and anti-cosmopolitanism (anti-immigration) ideals, many Eastern European states have begun to embrace more traditional values and conservatism. I’d use Viktor Orban’s Hungary, which I would call an illiberal democracy, as a particular example here, which has distanced itself from the West and adopted more of a nationalist authoritarian system somewhat along the lines of “Iron Curtain” states of the Cold War period for many of these reasons, a transition that we’ve also seen elements of in Eastern countries such as Russia and Poland.

We have also seen traditional values and conservatism gaining ground in Western European states, such as the UK and France. Do you think the current political trends in Europe will lead to tensions returning to Cold War levels?

Yeah, that’s a good point. Decisions such as the UK leaving the European Union and the rise of parties such as Nigel Farage’s Reform UK and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France have indicated the desires of some within the West to adopt more Eastern-style conservative and authoritarian political institutions in place of the liberal precedents. But I’m not quite sure that these movements will result in permanent change that could lead to significantly increased tensions.

One of the things I would point to is the fact that Poland, which had elected a conservative nationalist government, recently ousted their right-wing rulers and returned the liberals to power, who share mostly Western principles. That election indicates to me that many of the changes we’re seeing are more of a result of traditional pendulum swings and cultural fatigue with longstanding liberal democratic institutions.

In the UK, for example, the economy has been relatively poor throughout the 21st century, and because jobs and job security have been harder to come by in the ensuing years as a result, antagonism towards both the European Union and immigration institutions eventually led to Brexit and greater general acceptance of nationalist, conservative ideals. We’ve seen similar responses in Germany as a result of Angela Merkel letting in over a million migrants in 2015, as a response to what gets labeled as “wokeness.” I don’t think many of these things happen in a world where liberal democratic institutions have not had almost complete dominion over Western Europe for the past few decades.

I think that, overall, the growth of right-wing radicalism is beginning to peak throughout Europe. Now that many traditional conservative governments are in power, the tide of cultural fatigue is beginning to turn back towards liberal and free market institutions, signaling a reverse pendulum swing that makes it seem very unlikely to me that in the next few decades we'll see a return to Cold War levels of parity in regards to extremism and institutional differences.

How has the Russia-Ukraine War factored into the evolution of European institutions?

The Russian approach to the Russia-Ukraine War has served as the only real potential evidence I’ve seen of a return to Cold War-era tensions in Europe. The tensions between Russia and member states of both NATO and the European Union do seem to be approaching Cold War levels. Russia’s relationship with the West is really bad, and I can imagine it getting worse over the Ukraine issue in particular, as Russia has a deeply entrenched authoritarian government and enjoys disrupting other countries' politics while remaining economically isolated, much like its predecessor, the Soviet Union. As long as Putin remains in power, it's hard for me to see how that relationship gets better.

Regarding the War specifically, I think many Western European states have realized that they will have to change their economic relationship with Russia and become less dependent on it for resources such as oil, which has led to some increase in self-sufficient, isolationist tendencies, particularly in Germany. We’ve also seen many countries begin to spend more on their militaries and prioritize military alliances, such as with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, which does serve as a sort of throwback to the political landscape of Cold War-era Europe.

Has democracy been beneficial or detrimental to Eastern European economic development since the end of the Cold War?

Since the Cold War, we’ve seen Eastern European countries adopt forms of democracy more along traditionally Western lines, and at least economically, there has been a correlation between democracy and economic success. The Eastern states that embraced democracy also largely embraced economic reforms, which led to free market economic institutions that have been successful thus far. Many of those more successful countries are now a part of the European Union.

On the other hand, there were some Eastern states, like Russia, that initially attempted to embrace liberal reforms but quickly reverted back to authoritarian institutions that are restrictive of the economy. Most of these countries now have resource-driven economies, which have performed significantly worse than their Western European innovation-driven counterparts, so there’s also a correlation between authoritarian institutions and economic struggles that have primarily affected countries in the East.

What institutional advice would you give to the currently weaker states in Europe?

I would say there are just a few key factors that currently separate strong and weak states in Europe, mostly having to do with the strength of democratic institutions and internal unity.

From a purely institutional standpoint, I’d reference Francis Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order as the blueprint for what an “ideal” European state should look like, which he labeled “getting to Denmark.” As per his description, a strong European state should have primarily liberal democratic and free market institutions, along with some form of a welfare-based safety net for the lower classes. They should also have some form of standardized legal bureaucracy.

I’d personally caution against “quick fixes” such as technocracies, expert rule, and populism, as they can all have detrimental effects on the state of democracy. I believe that the best model for European states to become strong already exists, and the ideal pathway involves a state working its way up the established system by reducing internal corruption, deregulating the economy, and perpetuating democratic reforms. As such, I see some of the current shifts that we are seeing in Europe are resulting in a general weakening of the continent as a whole.

I also think that, in general, for a state to develop economically, it must maintain population growth, which is a problem that we’ve been seeing throughout much of Europe. Fertility rates in European countries are now almost fully below the replacement level of births, and with these states now also becoming less open to immigration, their populations are in a state of rapid decline. In order to support the set of institutions necessary to achieve strong state status, European states need to implement institutions that support increased birth rates and encourage immigration, which may necessitate an alteration of some current states’ government policies.

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(To be published soon.)